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The Economic and Cultural Impact of the 
Origins of Property: 1180-1220 
Robert C. Palmer 
The development of property in England between 1176 and 1220 was the 
result of a complicated interaction between social mores made law and 
bureaucratic action. In the Assize of Northampton, Henry II undertook 
regular supervision of proprietary decisions to prevent his men from prepar-
ing a rebellion like that of 1173-74. The supervision assumed peacetime 
feudal norms, but in the hands of bureaucratic justices even prior to 1200 
this supervision increasingly restricted lords' power to discipline their 
tenants, at a time when disciplinary power was far more important than 
proprietary decisions. By 1220, the relative importance of proprietary 
matters and disciplinary power had been reversed. But proprietary action by 
the lord was so attenuated that seisin-lawful possession-was possible 
now even without lordly acceptance. Such insulation of the tenant from his 
lord was a bond established between the tenant and his tenement: property. 1 
Similarly, insulation of tenant from lord constituted a relative increase in 
knightly independence: the obverse side of the centralization of power and 
interest embodied thereafter in the English Parliament. 
Robert C. Palmer is the Adler Fellow of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law and Associate 
Professor of Law at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of William and Mary. 
Versions of this paper have been given, notably at the University of Chicago Law School, the 
New York University seminar in law and history, and the Sixth British Legal History 
Conference. The criticisms at these meetings have proved uniformly helpful. This article was 
written with the aid of a summer research grant from the National Endowment for the 
Humanities. I am indebted to Nicholas Mayhew and Peter Spufford for allowing me to use 
their work prior to publication, and to Dr. Paul Hyams for drawing my attention to their 
work. I would like to thank Kathleen Crotty, my research assistant at Marshall-Wythe. 
I. The short forms for frequently cited works are the following: 
Bolton, English Economy: J.L. Bolton, The Medieval English Economy, 1150-1500 
(London, 1980). 
Glanvill: The Treatise on the Laws and Customs of the Realm of England Commonly 
Called Glanvill, G.D.G. Hall, ed. (Oxford, 1965). The author will, as is customary, be 
referred to as 'Glanvill' for reasons of convenience. 
Harvey, 'English Inflation': P.D.A. Harvey, 'The English Inflation of 1180-1220', in 
Peasants, Knights and Heretics, R.H. Hilton, ed. (Cambridge, 1976), 57-84. 
Mayhew, 'Frappes de monnaies': Nicholas J. Mayhew, 'Frappes de monnaies et hausse 
des prix en Angleterre de 1180 a 1220', in John Day, ed., Etudes d' histoire monhaire 
(Lille, 1984). 
Palmer, 'Origins of Property': Robert C. Palmer, 'The Origins of Property in Eugland', 
3 Law and History Review 1-50 (1985). 
Spufford, 'Le role de Ia monnaie': Peter Spufford, 'Le role de Ia monnaie dans Ia 
revolution commerciale du xiiie Siecle', in John Day, ed., Etudes d' histoire moneta ire 
(Lille, 1984). 
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The impact of the origins of property was immediate and substantial, both 
in economic terms and in the cultural perceptions of justice. Far more than 
any other factor, the appearance of property as a legal phenomenon was the 
cause of the inflation of 1180-1220. That inflation was the first of the two 
great pre-modem inflations. It constitutes an economic gauge of the social 
importance of the beginnings of the common law. Moreover, the develop-
ment of the law produced a change in the way people regarded authority, 
thus altering their perceptions about the nature of justice. Customs, when 
transformed into the common law, lost their flexibility and produced 
anomalous decisions that were nevertheless considered just. The magnitude 
of both the economic and cultural changes demonstrates the importance of 
the change in security of tenures which otherwise might now have been 
dismissed as an incremental change little different in kind from previous or 
subsequent alterations in the law. 
That law should have such an impact is in itself not surprising. Admitted-
ly, only a few people were involved in litigation on any given point, so that 
direct participation in litigation was not the main avenue whereby the law 
affected society. The use· of standardized writs that could and did carry 
predictable consequences, the use of sworn panels of people from the 
neighborhood to render verdicts, the use of eyres spread familiarity with the 
law rapidly among the baronage and the knightly tenants, particularly at the 
beginnings of the bureaucratic law when it was not significantly different in 
terminology and substance from social mores. The law operating in nearly 
familiar forms, focused tightly on particularly vital points of important 
social relationships, thus constituted a substantial social-economic force; it 
was institutionalized royal authority. That force impacted on those de-
termined to pursue traditional courses and on those ignorant of new ways. In 
some areas, it produced new and sometimes more effective ways to 
accomplish traditional objectives. Nevertheless, more effective instruments 
dictated that many were deterred from acting in other ways that were now 
subject to legal redress. Each facility entailed a restriction. 
The Great Inflation 
England experienced a major inflation between around 1180 and 1220. 
During that forty year period prices increased something like 300%? Prices 
increased for grains, livestock, military pay, and probably also for skilled 
work and agricultural services generally. 3 Moreover, no sector of the 
2. Harvey mentions once that prices doubled or trebled in the forty years (Harvey, 
'English Inflation', 58), but several times about three-fold rises in prices (ibid., at 67, 
69, 80). Bolton does not hazard an estimate at the total inflation involved, but 
characterizes it as 'rapid' (Bolton, English Economy, 21-22, 73, 76, 87). Both Mayhew 
and Spufford follow Harvey's estimate of the degree of the inflation. Mayhew, 
'Frappes de monaies', 160; Spufford, 'Le role de Ia monnaie', 365-66. 
3. Harvey, 'English Inflation', 58, 67, 69, 71. Bolton provides some figures for wheat 
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populace seems to have been particularly damaged. 4 The towns, which 
would have been particularly susceptible to injury from any increase merely 
in agricultural prices, prospered nonetheless. 5 
The effects of the inflation were manifold. Economic historians attribute 
to the inflation the change in agricultural management from farmers (long-
term lessees) to the use of bailiffs: a rational and successful effort to capture 
real value embodied in produce instead of a deteriorating fixed return. 6 
P.D.A. Harvey, in a very influential article, attributed various other things 
to the inflation: the termination of commutation of traditional labor services 
into money rents, the decline of villein status and the exclusion of villeins 
from common Jaw protection, the decline in the standing of the Jews (whose 
wealth was all in money of declining value), the difficulties of King John 
(who was more adversely affected in his income than were other lords), and 
the rebellion that produced Magna Carta. 7 For Harvey, and only to a 
somewhat lesser extent for other economic historians,8 the inflation was a 
major determinant of the condition of life in thirteenth-century England. In 
that society, a trebling of prices over the relatively short period of forty 
years could not help but have a dramatic impact on society, whether or not 
in the ways Harvey argued. 
Having traced the effects of the inflation, however, economic historians 
have had less success in proving causation. Harvey has stated that while the 
phenomenon of a drastic rise in prices was generally accepted, its nature as a 
monetary inflation (thus affecting all prices and not just selected sectors) 
was less certain, and that the causes were speculative.9 Harvey, J.L. Bolton 
and Nicholas Mayhew, however, all rule out coinage manipulation for the 
1180-1220 inflation: while changes in the metal content of the coinage had 
(more than doubled over the period: Bolton, English Economy, 69), but characterizes 
the general price increase in grains and livestock only as 'rapid': ibid. at 72. The precise 
degree of inflation is not important. Given the legal changes, even the absence of an 
inflation would be significant as indicating radical deflationary pressures. 
4. D.A. Carpenter, 'Was There a Crisis of the Knightly Class in the Thirteenth Century?', 
English Historical Review 95 (1980), 744-48, in response to P.R. Coss, 'Sir Geoffrey 
de Langley and the Crisis of the Knightly Class in Thirteenth-Century England', Past 
and Present, 68 (1975), 26-28. For villeins, see generally Hyams, King, Lords. and 
Peasants in Medieval England (Oxford, 1980), 221-65. 
5. Harvey, 'English Inflation', 71; Susan Reynolds, An Introduction to the History of 
English Medieval Towns, corrected reprint (Oxford, 1982), 46-51. 
6. Harvey, 'English Inflation', 58-59; Bolton English Economy, 87-88. Bolton mentions 
the interesting phenomenon that lay estates seemed to lead the way in the introduction 
of bailiffs. 
7. Harvey, 'English Inflation', 67, 73-79, summarized also in Bolton, English Ecrmomy, 
76. 
8. Bolton, English Economy, 73 ('the rapid inflation of 1180-1220 which set off the 
thirteenth-century boom'); Mayhew, 'Frappes de monnaies', 172-74. 
9. Harvey, 'English Inflation', 79. 
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some effect later on, there was no significant alteration at this time. 10 The 
inflation was thus not illusory: goods actually cost more in terms of precious 
metal and not merely in terms of number of coins. 
Harvey believes that phenomenal economic growth may have been 
responsible. He thinks that the strengthened government, after the Anarchy, 
permitted explosive growth in the export of various commodities to Europe: 
primarily of wool, but also of finished cloth, tin, and grains. The magnitude 
of these exports was such that it was not balanced by imports, so that 
payment for English goods was primarily in silver. 11 The dramatically 
increased volume of silver in England made every silver coin-the silver 
content of each remaining stable-worth less in terms of purchasing power. 
The price of all goods and services thus rose, producing a monetary 
inflation: an inflation affecting all goods and services. 
Nicholas Mayhew, more recently, has shown that there was a substantial 
influx of silver during these years. 12 The quantitative scale of that influx, 
however, remains open to question; and the slowing of the inflation around 
1220 to a relatively mild inflation during the next forty years, when one 
might have expected continued inflation based on silver coinage statistics, 
argues against a mono-causal monetarist explanation. 13 J.L. Bolton, writing 
well before Mayhew, prefers a demographic explanation for the price rise: 
increasing population and increased farming of marginal land put greater 
demand on limited resources so that prices rose. 14 As Mayhew has re-
marked, population growth tends to proceed relatively more slowly, so that 
demographics has a hard time explaining such a sudden and dramatic 
inflation. 15 Nonetheless, demographers will probably not acquiesce totally 
to Mayhew's figures, which are approximations, 16 or to an explanation 
based solely on monetarist theory. 17 
10. Ibid. at 80; Bolton, English Economy, 75-77; Mayhew, 'Frappes de monnaies', 
167-68. 
II. Harvey, 'English Inflation', 81-82. 
12. Mayhew, 'Frappes de monnaies', 160-68. The quantity of silver involved is far from 
certain. Mayhew's figures show a definite increase. The quantity involved is rendered 
uncertain by his necessary reliance on estimated figures for the percentage of total 
production of the various coins based in two small provincial mints (Carlisle and 
Lincoln). An important factor in the estimate (necessary for purposes of comparison to 
other statistics) is that each die produced 20,000 coins. The proper estimate of 
production from each die, as he explains at the beginning of his piece, is from 15,000 to 
20,000. Ibid., at 63. For the purpose of calculating actual increase in silver, therefore, 
the figures must be reduced, possibly by 20%. 
13. Harvey, 'English Inflation', 58; see the coinage figures in Mayhew, 'Frappes de 
monnaies', 165. 
14. Bolton, English Economy, 73-78. 
15. Mayhew, 'Frappes de monnaies', 167. 
16. Ibid. at 165-67. 
17. The polarization between the monetarists and the demographers is well-known. See 
Mavis Mate, 'High Prices in Early Fourteenth Century England: Causes and Con-
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Harvey seems to have the stronger case for the causation of the inflation; 
wool production does indeed seem to have increased under the Angevins. 18 
Still, there is no way to gauge the actual degree of exporting: there are no 
export or import schedules. Moreover, the gold:silver ratio is inconclusive. 
It changed, between 1159 and 1186, from 1:10 to 1:12; a devaluation of 
silver that would be consistent with an increase in the amount of silver in 
England. But for the vital time between 1186 and 1220 there is no similar 
evidence of change: the gold:silver ratio in 1265 was still 1:12. 19 Harvey 
reserved the possibility of intermediate fluctuations, but the continuity lends 
little support to the numismatic evidence. 20 Harvey's theory of causation for 
the inflation is thus not completely hypothetical, but it remains to be 
demonstrated that the quantity of silver coming into England could cause the 
degree of inflation that actually occurred and that the increase in silver 
actually was the mainspring behind the inflation. 
Bolton is skeptical about the monetarist theory of causation. Much of his 
skepticism comes from the lack of observable phenomena after 1220 that 
would confirm Harvey's scenario. 21 Bolton supports his view with the 
example of a single manor in which wages did not rise between 1201-1210 
and 1281-1290.22 The importance of such single items of information is 
indicative of the lack of information and the hypothetical nature of economic 
history of that time. Bolton's major concern with Harvey's suggested 
causation, however, is based on what he sees as its improbability. He thinks 
it improbable that the English failed to import much from the Continent, 
since the Germans seemed to think England a good market at this time. 
Importation of goods, of course, would mean a less favorable balance of 
payments and less importation of silver. Likewise, he notes that no one 
sequences', Economic History Review second series, 28 (1975), 6-8; N.J. Mayhew, 
'Numismatic Evidence and Falling Prices in the Fourteenth Century', Economic 
History Review, second series, 27, (1974), 1-2. 
18. T.H. Lloyd, The English Wool Trade in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1977), 6-9. He 
emphasizes that it was in part a resumption of the wool trade interrupted by the 
Anarchy. His account suggests that the Flemings were very much involved in the trade, 
so that Bolton's caveats about the recipients of the major profits may be well founded. 
Infra note 23. Likewise, although there was a rough correspondence between a 
temporary slowing in the inflation in the early 1190s, antagonism toward the Flemings, 
and interruption of the wool trade, the primary cause of the slowing of the inflation was 
the collection of Richard's ransom. Payment of the ransom would normally have 
resulted in massive deflation; the lack of substantial deflation indicates substantial 
inflationary pressures at work. 
19. Harvey, 'English Inflation', 80-81. Mayhew does not address the gold: silver ratio. 
20. Mayhew, 'Frappes de monnaies', 160-65. 
21. Bolton, English Economy, 76. 
22. Ibid. at 77. The evidence is that on the Winchester manors the piece rates for 
winnowing grain 'were virtually the same in 1281-90 as they had been in 1201-10'. 
This may well indicate nothing, as Bolton admits. (See his table of comparative rates 
between manors for the high degree of variation possible. Ibid. at 71.) Or it may 
indicate that increased liquidity of resources might not be exactly equivalent to an 
increase in specie in relation to certain kinds of activities subject to modest control. 
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knows who was controlling the wool exportation: it could have been in the 
hands of aliens and thus the profits could have been directed out of England. 
Finally, the Angevins are well-known for the massive amounts of silver 
exported from England providing for their wars in Europe, the Third 
Crusade, and the ransom of Richard I. Such deflationary exports of currency 
would necessitate even more massive exportation still to have resulted in the 
inflation: he finds the odds against such a massive and unbalanced exporta-
tion of goods unbelievable. 23 Harvey prefers the demographic model, only 
because it seems more believable, not because he can prove it. Still, he 
advances no convincing explanation for why there was the dramatic infla-
tion over the forty years, 1180-1220, and not more moderate inflation over a 
longer period of time: the latter a pattern perhaps more believable as the 
consequence of demographic pressures. In short, the economic historians 
who have dealt seriously with the inflation all have serious problems in 
determining its causes. 
For present purposes, the most striking aspect of the inflation is that it was 
insular: there was no substantial Continental parallel. 24 Thus the change in 
agricultural management from farmers (long-term lessees) to bailiffs who 
accounted for all the proceeds was solely an English phenomenon. 25 This 
insularity seems to undermine demographic change as the cause of the 
inflation, for the demographic changes had clear Continental parallels.Z6 
Given the similarity between Continental and English demographics, it 
would be hard to explain the English character of the inflation if the inflation 
had been fueled by the increase in population. 
Harvey perceived that the insularity of the inflation might indicate some 
causative relationship with another insular phenomenon: the growth of the 
common law. Both happened between roughly 1180 and 1220; neither had 
Continental parallels; both had a direct relationship to economic resources. 27 
23. Ibid. at 77. 
24. Harvey, 'English Inflation', 61. Bolton does not comment on the comparative question. 
Mayhew suggests a Continental parallel, but admits that the margin of error is very 
wide; moreover, the probability is that elsewhere inflation was much less drastic and 
peaked somewhat later. Mayhew, 'Frappes de monnaies', 167-72. Spufford empha-
sizes the severe nature of the English inflation evidenced by the change in English 
agricultural management from longterm leases to bailiffs and emphasis on labor 
services instead of money rents, whereas Continental agriculture reacted to a much 
milder inflation by changing labor services to money rents. Spufford, 'Le role de 
monnaie', 365-66. 
25. See supra note 24. 
26. RobertS. Lopez, The Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages, 950-1350 (Engle-
wood Cliffs, 1971), 27-30. 
27. One of the more perplexing aspects of economic historians' reluctance to treat law as a 
possible source of economic and social change is that they are perfectly ready to treat 
law as an instrument of oppression. See Harvey, 'English Inflation' ,77; R.H. Hilton, 
'Freedom and Villeinage in England', in Peasants, Knights and Heretics, supra note I 
at 184-190. Perhaps the explanation is the supposition that law as an instrument of 
oppression expresses accurately and without distortion the desires of its makers. 
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Mere coincidence, of course, is always a possibility; in this case there was a 
causal relationship. Harvey, however, mistakenly maintained that the infla-
tion caused the law. In that scenario, an inflation of hypothetical origin put 
lords in such economic straits that they resisted further royal exactions-
thus freezing feudal custom into law for themselves-but resisted any royal 
interference in the exercise of their control over the majority of their 
peasants-thus freezing villeins out of common law protection?8 The single 
strength of the suggestion is that it accounts for two gross legal phenomena: 
the feudal content of English law and the exclusion of villeins. The 
weaknesses, however, are overwhelming. His scenario does not account for 
the complexities of the law or for legal forms. Nor does it account for the 
fact that, while the law did not protect everyone, it nonetheless served many 
insignificant peasants, whom the law classified as free tenants capable of 
using the assize of novel disseisin. French law was not so generous. 
Moreover, his scenario portrays law as the final link in the chain of 
causation: a mere reflection of social change. Law, however, is a bureau-
cratic and economic force directed (intentionally or not) at highly focused 
points of social organization: the law has both social and economic im-
pact. 29 
My thesis is that the increased insulation of tenants from lordly control 
was equivalent to an increase in· the ability to manipulate land as an 
economic resource. That phenomenon, the result of many incremental 
political and bureaucratic events over the forty years, 30 necessarily resulted 
in great inflationary pressure, particularly since land was still the major form 
of economic resources around 1200. The economic theory on which the 
thesis rests can be stated in two different ways. A simple supply and demand 
formula is the more comprehensible. When a (here, the) major economic 
resource of a community becomes more available to fund purchases, prices 
of all items will increase, provided that the supply of items does not increase 
as fast as demand and purchasing power. The only brake on such a price 
increase would be the lack of a medium of exchange to convert the 
economic resource into actual funds, assuming the superior efficiency of 
coinage over barter. No such brake would operate at this time in England. 31 
As land, then, became more usable as an economic resource, that is, as that 
economic resource became more liquid, inflation was inevitable. The same 
28. Ibid. at 73-78; for a better evaluation, see generally Hyams, Kings, Lords, and 
Peasants, supra note 4 at 221-65. 
29. R.C. Palmer, The Whitton Dispute, 1264-1380: A Social-Legal Study of Dispute 
Settlement in Medieval England, (Princeton, 1984), 15-17. 
30. Palmer, 'The Origins of Property', 1-47. 
31. Mayhew, 'Frappes de monnaies', 160-72; Spufford, 'Le role de Ia monnaie', 357-60. 
The economic situation of England was determined by the coincidence of the two major 
sources, interacting but with separate origins: the greater control by tenants of the land 
as an economic resource (resulting from the common law and political decisions) and 
the availability of silver to facilitate the easy use of the land as an economic resource 
(resulting from the new German silver mines and passing through England via, among 
other things, the wool trade). 
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result, but less intelligibly, derives from the disputed Fisher equation: 
PT =MY. 32 Here P is the general price level; T, the number of transactions; 
M, the money supply; V, the velocity of money circulation. P obviously 
increased markedly: that was the content of the inflation. One can assume 
that T increased to some extent, because England had a reputation for 
consumption at this time. 33 M increased noticeably. 34 And finally, V (which 
has long been unknown for this time35) increased substantially with the 
increased liquidity of land as an economic resource (assuming again that 
people did not refrain from spending). Before proceeding, it should be noted 
that no one knows, or for present purposes needs to know, the absolute level 
of the use of land as a liquid economic resource, provided the absolute level 
was not miniscule. The relative increase is the significant factor. Any 
increase in the actual liquidity of such a major economic resource would 
have an immense impact on prices. 
Precisely those changes in the common law already described, albeit 
perceived in a different context, explain the great inflation of 1180-1220. 
Two gross changes are significant. The first is the increase in alienability36 
by tenants. Full alienability is, of course, in some sense the final implication 
of liquidity. For medieval England it was an important, but not the most 
significant factor. 37 More important than full alienability was the increased 
ability of tenants to use land as security for loans.Together, these two 
alterations constituted a major change in the liquidity of land as an economic 
resource, a change of such dimensions that it fueled an inflation of nearly 
300% over the course of forty years despite severe deflationary pressures. 
Glanvill indicated around 1188 that alienation was difficult. He did not 
even mention the problems inherent in substitution:38 a substitution without 
the lord's consent was still unthinkable, because the tenant's title was still a 
32. Bolton, English Economy, 73. See the cautions on the Fisher equation in Mate, 'High 
Prices', supra note 17 at 6-8. 
33. Harvey, 'English Inflation', 68. 
34. Mayhew, 'Frappes de monnaies', 160-65. 
35. Bolton and Mayhew assert that little can be known concerning V for the late twelfth and 
early thirteenth centuries. Bolton, English Economy, 73-74; Mayhew, 'Frappes de 
monnaies', 174). That may be true in general, but not in this particular instance. 
36. The increase in alienability is not a matter of dispute, but has been a matter of 
consensus among legal historians since Maitland. F. Pollock and F. W. Maitland, The 
History of English Law Before the Time of Edward/, 2nd. ed. with introduction by 
S.F.C. Milsom (Cambridge, 1968), I :329-37. The only issue is whether the change 
occurred intentionally or by juristic accident. R.C. Palmer, 'Feudal Framework of 
English Law', 79 Michigan Law Review 1132 (1981). 
37. Alienation might have been quite significant, in that a tenant might well have been 
willing to sell a small portion of a tenement or the whole of a tenement held of other 
than his main lord. Usually, however, tenants tended to want to retain the fee and resist 
complete alienation. In such a society, less drastic options for tenants assume greater 
importance. 
38. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, supra note 36 at I :332n; S.F.C. 
Milsom, The Legal Framework of English Feudalism (Cambridge, 1976), 103-104. 
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personal relationship. The difficulties encountered even in subinfeudation, 
however, were immense. Both lord and tenant's (eventual) heir shared with 
the current tenant the power of granting the land. The lord's interest was 
rather less than the eventual heir's, but no less restrictive. No tenant could 
subinfeudate in such a way that the services would be endangered: that 
would be cause for immediate disciplinary disinheritance. 39 Thus, even 
though a tenant could grant anyone a reasonable portion of his land (to be 
held thus of the grantor40) the reasonableness of the grant was a matter for 
determination by the lord and his court. The possible sanction-the loss of 
the whole fee held of that lord-was sufficiently severe that only despera-
tion would push a tenant into a grant that would seem excessive to the lord. 
The heir's right was less predictable. His ability to nullify his deceased 
father's grant derived from the original character of feudal grants-grants in 
fee-as personal relationships, so that the grant ended with the death of 
either party. Thus, originally, homage had to be done at the death of either 
lord or tenant. 41 Prior to 1176, then, an heir, on succeeding to the lordship 
of his father, was bound to renew grants only to the extent that moral! 
political considerations bound him. Those considerations should not be 
underestimated, because they formed the basis for the lordly heir's authority 
and the exercise of his influence. But after the provision of mort d'ancestor 
and novel disseisin, not even the death of both parties rendered a homage 
ineffective: the tenant's heir had an enforceable right to enter the tenement. 
The lordly heir's power to revoke his father's grant, however, survived in 
the context of grants by fathers to younger sons. Such a grant was 
intrinsically unreasonable:42 the first-born would inevitably revoke the grant 
with no adverse consequences. A grant to daughters, however, was far more 
stable:43 no sane person would have granted excessively to a daughter, 
whereas fathers notoriously favored younger sons.44 Such a suspect grant to 
a younger son, then, could only be made stable if the first-born made the 
grant his own: by confirmation at the time of the father's grant. 45 Problems, 
39. Glanvill, IX. I. 
40. Ibid. at Vll.i. 
41. Thome provides a chronology that (I) prior to 1166 homage had to be renewed at the 
death of either party, (2) after 1166 homage did not have to be renewed as long as either 
party survived, and (3) after 1176 the homage bar subsisted even to benefit the tenant's 
heir. The date of 1166 depended, apparently, on the supposition that the assize of novel 
disseisin became a general remedy at that time. It is thus better to use 1176 as a major 
changing point until it is clear how novel disseisin really developed. S.E. Thorne, 
'English Feudalism and Estates in Land', 17 Cambridge Law Journal 200-201 ( 1959). 
42. Glanvill, VII. I. This statement applies only to the inherited land. The sociological 
explanation for the greater acceptance of grants from acquired lands (in feudal 
relations) is that lords preferred such arrangements: it tended to reduce the number of 
tenants with multiple lords:. 
43. Ibid. 
44. Ibid. See Palmer, Whilton Dispute, supra note 29 at 28-60. 
45. Glanvill, VII. I. By Glanvill's time, the necessity for the heir's consent to ordinary 
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however, might arise even in such a grant and confirmation. Unless the 
confirmation by the apparent heir worked as some variety of conveyancing 
magic-a highly improbable suggestion for the twelfth-century context-
then the grant would still fail if the apparent heir predeceased his father, 
leaving as the real heir the second son who had not approved the father's 
grant to the third son. The personality of grants cannot be ignored; nor can 
the real limitations imposed by death in a society in which no bureaucratic 
agency existed to grant one an afterlife of decision-making and control. 
Moreover, even the obligation of warranty in regard to ordinary grants was 
conditional. Glanvill's phraseology must be carefully observed: the heir had 
to warrant all his ancestor's reasonable grants. 46 Unreasonable grants-
grants that endangered the integrity of the fee-could still be avoided. 
The effect of the legal changes in the years from Glanvill to 1220 was the 
consolidation of the power to alienate by subinfeudation into the hands of 
the current tenant in fee. The lord had had the authority to disinherit a tenant 
who by imprudent grants from the tenement had endangered the services 
due. In the 1190s and the early thirteenth century such disinheritances 
became very difficult. They could be accomplished, if at all, only by legal 
proceedings in the king's court pursuant to a writ of right. A straightforward 
disinheritance in the lord's court for proper disciplinary motives fell under 
the censure of the assize of novel disseisin. 47 
Like the lord's power to disinherit for disciplinary reasons, the heir's 
power to revoke his ancestor's unreasonable grants disappeared: that dis-
appearance was a complex but integral aspect of heritability and warranty. 
Mort d'ancestor dictated that the heir of a seised tenant could occupy the 
land, regardless of whether the lord or the lord's heir approved. 48 The writ 
of right dictated that the acceptance of a tenant by an entitled lord would 
constitute an obligation for the current lord, subject to the discretionary 
considerations of the grand assize. 49 The obligation to warrant not only 
grants to strangers had been superseded by the emphasis on warranty, leaving only 
certain categories of suspect grants particularly requiring the heir's consent: grants to 
younger sons, death-bed grants, and perhaps a few others. Otherwise, the heir's 
opposition was ineffective. 
46. Ibid. at VII.2. 
47. Palmer, 'Origins of Property', 21-24. 
48. The Assize of Northampton identified the lord as the primary person responsible for 
keeping an heir out of the tenement, so that his approval was not presumed. Palmer, 
'Origins of Property', 13-17; S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common 
Land, 2nd. ed. (London, 1981), 134-37. 
49. Palmer, 'Origins of Property', 8-11, 24. The grand assize asked the sworn panel who 
had greater right. The comparative nature of that issue meant that the panel, if so 
disposed, could consider all those discretionary values that lords and their courts had 
properly considered, although now less effectively because transposed from their 
natural setting. Thus transposed, those discretionary considerations seem largely to 
have died out in favor of strict rules of law, only partly because the grand assize 
declined in use. 
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personal but also ancestral grants-providing escambium if necessary in 
cases of double obligation-showed the determination of the king's court 
not to allow a homage to perish;50 the lord and heir rule showed the same 
determination. 51 The preservation of homages was the bureaucratic man-
ifestation of the purposes of the Assize of Northampton. 52 As long as such 
obligations finally ended in the grand assize, warranty obligations could 
remain flexible and reasonable. But with ostensibly three-handed writs of 
entry the issue would come before a jury, not a grand assize. That jury 
would determine a narrow issue of fact. Thus, if there had been an 
acceptance, the lord would be bound. 53 The rigidity that assured inheritance 
by a tenant's heir was thus, from a different perspective, the (lord's) heir 
being unable to revoke his father's unreasonable grant. The lord's heir was 
bound, to the complete extent of his inheritance from his predecessor, the 
grantor. 54 The rules that applied between the lord and his heir applied also as 
between tenant and tenant's heir, because tenant could in turn be lord to 
further tenants. Consolidation of control over subinfeudation into the hands 
of the current tenant was thus not an abstract preference in favor of free 
alienability of the fee, 55 but a necessary by-product of the suppression of 
disciplinary disinheritance and the honoring of established homage rela-
tionships. 
Between 1176 and 1220, then, the control and interests over any particu-
lar free-holding of land became concentrated, gradually and increasingly, in 
the current tenant. The heir was left with no control, but with a secure 
inheritance in whatever fee had remained with his father at death. The lord 
was left with a secure interest in the feudal incidents, but with no discipli-
nary power. The concentration of rights allowed the current tenant to sell 
securely and without the participation of anyone but the tenant himself and 
the purchaser, who would have to hold the land from the grantor, the 
previous tenant. Moreover, the sale would be secure-if performed 
correctly-and would last in perpetuity, not just for the lives of the original 
parties. Land had been changed from a relatively frozen asset to a relatively 
liquid asset. Regardless of the absolute level of transactions, land could now 
enter the market in a decisive way. 
The process, nonetheless, was not one clearly recognized by the people 
who lived through it. There was not a grand moment at which the court 
50. Glanvill, III. I. The language about a homage perishing comes from Glanvill and 
indicates the almost surreal quality that homage had taken on. Ibid. at VII.12. 
51 . The lord and heir rule mandated that relatives play musical chairs with the tenement to 
prevent the lordship and tenancy from collapsing, regardless of whether the results were 
at odds with the intent of the donor. Once a homage had been established, it was not 
allowed to perish unless for complete lack of possible heir. 
52. Palmer, 'Origins of Property', 12-23. 
53. Henry de Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, G.E. Woodbine, ed. and 
S.E. Thome, trans. (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1968), 4:196, 215, 235. 
54. Milsom, Historical Foundations, supra note 48 at 179. 
55. Palmer, 'Feudal Framework', supra note 36 at 1133-34. 
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announced to the populace-or even to lawyers-that the fee was alienable 
and outlined the rights of tenants. The persistence of the grand assize 
precluded that. 56 But right around 1200 it is clear that prospective heirs no 
longer had to consent. Perhaps even more telling, simultaneously grants 
came to be made not just to 'A and his heirs' but also to 'A and his heirs and 
assigns', thus acknowledging the ability of a grantee to alienate. 57 Even so, 
perception lagged behind court practice. Seemingly, also, other values-
moral and traditional-slowed the utilization of the new possibilities. Even 
in the mid-thirteenth century the absolute frequency of sales was not high. 58 
But unless restraint was indeed phenomenal, there had been a significant 
increase spread over the forty years. The slowly increased utilization of the 
incremental alterations in the manipulability of the major form of wealth 
would account for at least part of the force behind the inflation between 
1180 and 1220. 
The second change-the greater ease in using land as security for 
loans-was the more economically significant development. By 1220 
tenants could certainly use land as security for loans. Granting a term in the 
land, even if not strictly as a gage, was an easy method of obtaining a loan. 
Later in the thirteenth century the courts made it possible for lenders to be 
assured of obtaining the proceeds of lands upon default, even though the 
creditors had not been previously in possession. That process proceeded by 
recognition and enrollment, but was not available before the late thirteenth 
century. 59 Its importance here is that that process followed on from the 
substantial change in the early thirteenth century, establishing the direction 
in which the law concerning land and loans was developing. But the 
thirteenth-century part of the argument needs little proof. The frequency of 
the writ ad terminum qui preteriit argues strongly enough on its own for the 
frequency of the grant of terms. 60 The use of land as security for loans might 
56. Text supra at note 53. Use of the grand assize had certainly declined between 1200 and 
1220, but the grand assize was hardly an infrequent phenomenon still in 1220, because 
the writs of entry had not by that time taken hold of a large body of litigation: they were 
still used in only a few situations and then not very frequently. 
57. Carpenter, 'Was There a Crisis', supra note 4 at 728. 
58. Pollock and Maitland, The History of English Law, supra note 36 at 2:14, note 2: 
'Generally in a collection of charters we shall find two changes occurring almost 
simultaneously soon after the year 1200:-(1) the donor's expectant heirs no longer join 
in the gift; (2) the donee's "assigns" begin to be mentioned.' Bailey found a few 
mentions of assigns in grants prior to 1200, in 1196 and 1199, but concluded that 
'There is no indication yet [in the reign of Richard I], however, that the bond of 
warranty can ordinarily extend further to mere assigns'. S.J. Bailey, 'Warranties of 
Land in the Reign of Richard I', 9 Cambridge Law Journal 197-98 (1945). 
59. T.F.T. Plucknett, Legislation of Edward I (Oxford, 1962), 136-61. 
60. Ad terminum qui preteriit was not only the earliest, but also the most frequently used 
writ of entry. Early in the thirteenth century, the writ changed from mentioning a gage 
to mentioning a term. The difference is substantial, because that enabled the writ to 
protect a life tenancy also and not merely commercial arrangements. The motivation 
behind the change, however, is not clear, unless it was explicitly to make the writ more 
versatile. One would like to find a better reason. 
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even be considered as strictly included in the broader capability to alienate 
without interference from lord or heir. 
The frequency of gaging land in the twelfth century was low in relation to 
the same activity in the thirteenth century. The increasing facility to use land 
to secure loans in the thirteenth century argues in that direction: it makes one 
at least suspect that it was more difficult to use land in that way in the 
twelfth century. One early stage in the process may have been royal pressure 
to allow tenants to borrow to go on Crusade; another would have been the 
increase in coinage in Angevin England. 61 The most convincing evidence, 
however, is the writ of entry ad terminum qui preteriit. That writ was 
two-handed, in that its reach was limited to the second tenant after the land 
had passed out of the claimant's line of title. Such two-handed writs always 
evidenced the loss of lordly control, because writs of entry were typically 
three-handed. Two-handed writs eliminated the lord from the writ, because 
it was a situation in which the lord had lost control and thus had done 
nothing in the transferal of the land. 62 The writ of entry ad terminum qui 
preteriit originated at least as early as 1199 and already at that date can be 
found at full reach. Some years prior to 1199, then, lords had exercised 
decisive control over gaging activities; by 1199 they had found that they 
could not effectively control gages.63 
Twelfth century feudal control over gages complicated and retarded the 
use of land as an economic resource. Certain kinds of gages, of course, 
would be easy enough. If the lord was to be the creditor, there would be no 
problem. If the land involved was only a small portion of the whole 
tenement that would not endanger the services, a tenant had no reason to 
fear disciplinary disinheritance because of an excessive subtenancy. But if 
the land constituted either the whole tenement or a large enough portion to 
endanger the services (whether of one's whole tenement or of the tenement 
held of a particular lord), special care would be necessary. The tenant had to 
secure his lord's consent to the transaction. Any creditor would insist on 
that, and some might also insist on the heir's consent, particularly in cases 
when, on default, the land was to be held from the debtor. The lord would 
often have no interest in the arrangement as such, but would have great 
interest in making sure the creditor would be a suitable tenant. The younger 
son of another tenant, financed perhaps by his father, would be an attractive 
creditor; a money-lender might not. 
Prior to 1176, the multiple consents required from people with diverse 
standards and concerns retarded the use of land as an economic asset. 
Concentration of control over the land facilitated that use. By 1220 land had 
become about as liquid as it would be until the end of the fourteenth 
61. Ralph de Diceto, Ymagines Historiarum in The Historical Works of Master Ralph de 
Diceto, William Stubbs, ed., Rolls Series, vol. 68b (London, 1884), 74. 
62. Palmer, 'Origins of Property', 25-39. 
63. Ibid. at 37-39. 
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century. 64 The late thirteenth century devices were desirable for creditors, 
but could not have had the same economic impact: the same degree of 
change was no longer possible. The facility for using land as security for 
loans, however, is precisely the kind of activity that would increase the 
velocity of the currency in existence or, from a different perspective, 
increase the economic resources available to purchase the existing stock of 
goods. Governmental action, directed at other and narrower ends,65 here 
had a social and economic impact of monumental proportions. 
The precise economic effects of the legal changes are incapable of 
definition at this point, but some possibilities should be mentioned. One 
should not think solely of legal causation throughout the forty years. The 
concentration of control over tenements was the mainspring, but a complex 
interaction between legal doctrine and social change undoubtedly ensued. 
One activity made possible by the greater facility to borrow would be 
improvement of holdings, by the purchase or decreased slaughter of stock, 
by the addition of lands, by the use of better agricultural tools and 
routines. 66 England's wool production expanded at this time, but one can 
posit a Jess explosive growth: the hypothesis of massive exports unbalanced 
by imports is unnecessary. 67 Similarly, the inflation itself probably dictated 
that agricultural management change to bailiffs instead of long-term lessees. 
The economic climate of the thirteenth century can thus be reconciled 
with the inflation. Tenants did not feel in dire economic straits. The greater 
liquidity of economic assets affected everyone who held land; those who 
were Jess fortunate peasants were the producers of high-priced foodstuffs. 
The inflation would have injured relatively few, and mostly only those 
whom historians cannot examine for Jack of records. The use of bailiffs was 
an adjustment, not a response to excruciating economic pressure at all. 
Moreover, that change might have resulted from a shift in attitudes toward 
tenements. A tenant could be confident of his relationship with his lord, 
although knowing that everything depended on the personal relationship. In 
that situation, attention was diverted away from efficient management of the 
tenement and toward cultivation of the relationship. Moreover, there was 
always the insecurity of the possibility of disinheritance, particularly acute 
for those who held land from more than one lord. It was quite a different 
64. The beginnnings of the use ('use' here defined not only as one party holding for the 
benefit of another, but also holding in such a way that there is a divergence between 
co-existing legal title and moral entitlement: Palmer, Whilton Dispute, supra note 29 at 
pp. 200-208, 278) enabled tenants to treat their land like chattels, avoiding various 
burdens and facilitating the payments of debts even after the tenant's death. It is 
unlikely that that greater facility had such an enormous impact, however, because the 
relative increase in liquidity would not have been as great as that between 1180 and 
1220. 
65. Milsom, Legal Framework, supra note 38 at 183-86. 
66. Bolton, English Economy, 82-84, 88-90. Investment in this way, of course, produces 
deflation in the shortrun, although it would contribute to exports within a relatively 
short time. The investment cycle emphasizes the inflationary pressure. 
67. See text supra at notes 18-20. 
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thing to be the owner of property. The concentration of control would result 
in a different attitude toward land: while lords remained important, the 
security of tenure would encourage the development of the tenant's eco-
nomic, as distinct from relational base. 68 In a similar vein, silver probably 
did flow into England, partly as payment for exports, partly for other 
reasons. The common law created a situation more favorable to lending than 
that in France; it would not be surprising had there been some influx of 
silver lured by the better opportunities in England. But one can also suppose 
that it flowed out of England, without losing the only explanation for the 
inflation. The precise nature of the interaction between the legal changes 
and the social-economic consequences-which perhaps in their tum made 
further legal alterations acceptable-was undoubtedly complex. The only 
sure thing is that the economics of the inflation were similarly complex, that 
the inflation cannot be explained in a mono-causal manner. Both M and V 
rose rapidly, and the rise in V related to the common law was not caused 
solely or even mainly by M, although M and V interacted. The rise in P, 
high as it was, was moderated necessarily by a rise in T, the number of 
transactions. This explanation is simply more believable than a purely 
monetarist argument. The common law was thus not the product of choices 
dictated by external financial pressures. It was the product of political 
problem-solving and bureaucratic judicial action, itself an economic phe-
nomenon and force. 
The political decisions and the bureaucratic actions of the justices, 
technical as the process was, were of great social moment. The common law 
did not originate in transfers of jurisdiction from feudal courts to the king's 
court. Indeed, the process was hardly a transfer in any significant sense. 
More than anything else, it was regulation. 69 That regulation of feudal 
courts-intended at every point not to change feudal relationships as much 
as to make them operate by their own proper standards-eliminated lordly 
discretion, created property right, and thus severed the severe dependency 
of tenants on their lords. The magnitude of the change is evident from the 
magnitude of the inflation that resulted in part from the tenant's increased 
security and control over his tenement. An inflation of 300% in forty years 
constitutes one of the two great pre-modem inflations. Fortunately for those 
in the thirteenth century, the inflation was part of a complex economic 
situation that created few victims. Thirteenth-century England knew growth 
and prosperity, not economic stagnation and despair. 70 
68. This statement is equivalent to the normal historical statements that authority was 
becoming centralized, that loyalty was beginning to move from local (or lordly) affairs 
to the king's government. 
69. Palmer, 'Feudal Framework', supra note 36 at 1133. 
70. Bolton, English Economy, 73. 
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Magna Carta, 61 
Profound legal and economic changes necessarily suppose a certain 
change in cultural expectations. That cultural change was embodied in 
Magna Carta. Magna Carta in some sense was the consequence of a 
multiplicity of problems that made King John vulnerable to baronial rebel-
lion. In a deeper sense, however, Magna Carta resulted from a change in 
attitude about the proper role of discretion in lordship: about the nature of 
justice. John suffered from a lack of magnanimity and an excess of 
distrust/ 1 from severe military losses,72 and from his dispute with the 
papacy over the appointment of a new archbishop of Canterbury. 73 But John 
was not radically more high-handed than his brother or father. 74 Indeed, part 
of his problem derived from the fact that he devoted more attention to 
English government after the loss of Normandy and Anjou. 75 Regardless of 
the personality of the king, however, a reaction to the Angevin style of 
exercising monarchical power was not surprising. The Angevins had re-
tained a form of kingship that embodied old-style lordly authority, 76 while 
the personnel they commanded as king grew into a more uniform bureau-
cracy more effective and more deeply and uniformly felt. In the reign of 
Henry II, this had not caused any particularproblems: all lords possessed 
powers and broad discretion roughly similar to those of the king. Royal 
powers were little different and thus little resented. 77 By John's reign, 
however, the regulation of feudal courts and lordly authority by the king's 
court had produced a standard of justice that increasingly eliminated 
discretionary justice, that valued rigid rules of law more highly than 
71. W.L. Warren, King John (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1978), 190-91, 257-59. 
72. Ibid. at 96-99, 102-105. 
73. Ibid. at 154-73. 
74. Ibid. at 174-80; Doris M. Stenton, English Justice Between the Norman Conquest and 
the Great Charter, 1066-1215 (Philadelphia, 1964), 88-114; J.C. Holt, Magna Carta 
(Cambridge, 1965), 38. 
75. John's attention to the courts together with the discretion acknowledged to reside in the 
king in person as distinct from his ministers made his presence a worrisome matter, 
quite apart from his personality. D. Stenton, English Justice, supra note 74 at 93-114. 
76. Milsom, Legal Framework, supra note 38 at 25. The perception that the king's 
prerogative was in large part not something extraordinary but merely a maintenance of 
old right explains why the royal prerogative did not receive much attention as such until 
the reign of King John. Bryce Lyon, A Constitutional and Legal History of Medieval 
England, 2nd. ed. (New York, 1980), 496. 
77. In this context, it is particularly interesting to note that one of the precursors of Magna 
Carta ( 1215), c. 39 was the protest against disseisins made by the mere will of royal 
ministers. The resolution in 1191 was that free tenants would be treated by judgment in 
the king's court 'according to the lawful customs and assizes of the realm or by the 
mandate of the lord king'. Holt, Magna Carta, supra note 74 at 103. Magna Carta 
(1215), c. 39 is pointed precisely against royal disseisins by will, previously thought 
acceptable. 
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discretion. The pseudo-feudal content of Magna Carta, c. 61, demonstrates 
that baronial perception of the changed social-legal world. 
The enforcement clause of Magna Carta, chapter 61, established a council 
of twenty-five barons to secure the peace. It provided that the barons could 
choose twenty-five of their number who would be particularly responsible 
for enforcing the provisions of Magna Carta. If the king or any of his 
officers violated the charter, the offense would be reported to a committee of 
four barons. They would then petition the king for redress. After forty 
days78 without satisfaction, the twenty-five barons and the whole communi-
ty of the realm could distrain the king by seizing his castles, lands, and 
possessions until satisfaction was made, whereupon everything would be 
restored. Moreover, the king undertook to assist in having people take an 
oath to obey the orders of the twenty-five. This court of twenty-five was 
neither a nostalgic reincarnation of old-style feudal courts nor a precocious 
anticipation of parliament. 79 It was rather a precise reflection of the feudal 
courts and the feudal concerns of England in 1215. 
Feudal concerns permeated Magna Carta. A major portion of the 1215 
version sought to define various aspects of the feudal relationship. 8° Chap-
ters 2-8 were quite explicit. They laid out a set relief to be paid by heirs of 
the king's tenants; forbade the demand of a payment of relief when the heir 
had already been in wardship; provided for wardship of lands to preserve 
their value for the heir when he came of age; mandated that heirs would be 
married without disparagement; gave assurance that widows would receive 
their marriage portion and inheritance promptly, as well as their dower;81 
78. Note that the forty-day period was the same as the notice to be given for a meeting of 
the magnates to render counsel. Magna Carta (1215), c. 14. 
79. Sayles regards the clause as a 'legalization of war' and in the end does not distinguish 
between the intent of the clause itself (first qualified by the correct comment that 'there 
was no thought of deposing the Lord's annointed') and the effect of the rebellion that 
followed on the royal intransigence toward distraint ('Magna Carta ... put down in 
black and white ... that, if he abused his power, he forfeited his authority and 
position'. G. 0. Sayles, The Medieval Foundations of England (New York, 1961), 
406-407. Jolliffe imports into the clause the idea of diffidation, so that the clause 
legitimated feudal rebellion. J.E.A. Jolliffe, The Constitutional History of Medieval 
England from the English Settlement to 1485, 4th ed. (New York, 1961), 258-59. But 
the barons were supposed to distrain only, and the clause contains no hint of diffidation. 
McKechnie relates the clause likewise to diffidation and feudal rebellion and raised 
further the question of sovereignty: 'If it had been possible to put so violent an 
expedient into practice, the "sovereignty", or supreme power in England, would have 
been split in two. John would have held the sceptre only until his opponents declared 
that he had broken the Charter, when, by his own previously-granted mandate, it would 
pass to the twenty-five barons.' WilliamS. McKechnie, Magna Carta: A Commentary 
on the Great Charter of King John, 2nd. ed. (New York, 1914), 468. Holt's treatment 
is more accurate, but does not treat the clause's relationship to the common law. Holt, 
Magna Carta, supra note 74 at 239-40. 
80. Holt, Magna Carta, supra note 74 at 206-211. 
81. See S.F.C. Milsom, 'Inheritance by Women in the Twelfth and Early Thirteenth 
Centuries', in MorrisS. Arnold, Thomas A. Green, et at., On the Laws and Customs of 
England: Essays in Honor of Samuel E. Thorne (Chapel Hill, 1981). 
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and forbade coercion to make widows remarry while preserving the lord's 
(the king's) right to consent to her marriage if she wanted to marry again. 
Chapter 12 provided that there would be scutages and aids only in certain 
situations. The barons and their advisors were deeply concerned with the 
consequences of their feudal relationship with the king. In large part, 
moreover, what they were seeking was not new. The king's court had 
increasingly been making them treat their men as they were now demanding 
that the king treat them. 82 They were applying to the king the new common 
Jaw standards of proper treatment; the king until then had preserved the old, 
pre-common law style of lordship. 
The barons continued to consider their feudal courts important in-
stitutions, despite crippling regulation by the king's court. Chapter 34, for 
instance, mandated that the writ precipe not be issued in such a manner as to 
deprive free men of their courts. The problem confronted was the litigant's 
ability to avoid the feudal court and thus avoid the lord's supervision by 
purchasing a precipe writ without justifying his choice of venue. If one 
excludes the mere uncontrolled and/or positively Machiavellian issuance of 
precipe writs as improbable, the problem presented in the precipe writs 
could well have originated with the issuance of royal protections to in-
dividuals granting them the privilege of not being impleaded elsewhere than 
before the king or his justices. Such a protection possessed by the tenant 
would legitimate the plaintiff's purchase of a precipe, but could well have 
left the lord in ignorance of the possible impending change in tenants: an 
inappropriate situation in 1215 and still for some further decades. Chapter 
34 mandated that the lord not be circumvented in such fashion. The 
immediate result was the disappearance of the undifferentiated precipe83 and 
its replacement by two forms of precipe writs containing jurisdictional 
clauses. 84 Those clauses explained either that the claimant claimed to hold 
directly of the king or that the proper lord had remitted his jurisdiction in this 
individual case to the king. 85 Cases involving such privileged individuals 
would thus have had to originate in the feudal courts and then be removed, 
or else the claimant would have to obtain the lord's consent originally to 
have the case come in the king's court. The feudal court could not simply be 
ignored. 
Chapter 39 (in later issues of Magna Carta to become the famous chapter 
29) demonstrates a similar mindset in regard to feudal courts. The chapter 
82. Milsom, Legal Framework, supra note 38 at 25; Palmer, 'Feudal Framework', supra 
note 55 at 1163. 
83. Glanvill, 1.6; Robert C. Palmer, The County Courts of Medieval England, 1150-1350 
(Princeton, 1982), 165. 
84. Early Registers of Writs, Elsa de Haas and G.D.G. Hall, eds. Selden Society, vol. 97 
(London, 1970), 36-37 (CC. 8, 10). I am inclined to reject the suggestions that Magna 
Carta, c. 34, precipitated the inclusion of entry words as jurisdictional clauses, because 
I cannot see any major change in writs of entry immediately after Magna Carta. Palmer, 
'Origins of Property', 39. 
85. Milsom, Historical Foundations, supra note 48 at 125-26. 
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forbade pumttve royal action against individuals unless 'by the lawful 
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land'. 86 The undesirable royal 
actions fell mostly under the category of crown pleas, since arrests, 
imprisonment, outlawry, exile, and general destruction of an individual 
were mentioned. Perhaps the best summary would be those actions a lord 
would take against one he considered disloyal or hostile, and thus guilty of 
feudal treason, in this case, of course, against the king. But disseisins were 
also mentioned, so that one must assume that the difficulties were not 
completely restricted to crown pleas. The relevant problem with chapter 39 
is the meaning of 'lawful judgment of his peers'. The meaning that was later 
read into that phrase was trial by jury. In that reading, the vel in 'by the 
lawful judgment of his peers or by the Jaw of the land' takes a conjunctive, 
instead of disjunctive meaning. 87 Thus 'lawful judgment of his peers' would 
be merely an anticipatory specification of one crucially important part of the 
law of the land. But among crown pleas, only de odio et atya made use of 
the jury. The vast majority of crown pleas were still determined either by 
battle or ordeal. Jury trial in crown pleas only became regularized as the 
result of the decrees of the Fourth Lateran Council, which did not reach 
England until after Magna Carta. 88 Even then, the jury was not the obvious 
and immediate substitute for the ordeal. Moreover, the use of the jury trial in 
normal civil matters, such as the assize of novel disseisin, was already so 
well established that it is unlikely that the barons would have bothered to 
insist other than that the king proceed by the law of the land, had 'lawful 
judgment of his peers' really meant trial by jury. The meaning of the phrase, 
rather, must refer to a feudal court, where a man would really receive 
judgment, instead of merely a verdict, at the hands of his peers. The court 
contemplated as rendering such a judgment was the king's feudal court, 
whether for England or for Wales. That court was not a common law court; 
it would not proceed by jury trial. The meaning of vel in chapter 39 was thus 
properly disjunctive, because the feudal court was a proper alternative to 
proceeding by the Jaw of the land. 
Chapter 52 confirms both the meaning of the Chapter 39 'lawful judgment 
of his peers' and the barons' concern with feudal courts. It falls in the latter 
part of Magna Carta that details redress of specific problems, here, with 
problems deriving from disseisins made without lawful judgment of the 
disseisee's peers. That wording is important, because it avoids the routine 
words of the assize of novel disseisin: 'unjustly and without a judgment'. 
The words thus mirror the words ofchapter 39 and refer to disseisins made 
without the judgment of the king's feudal court. The chapter differentiates 
between wrongful disseisins thus done by King John (personal wrongs and 
thus properly redressed immediately or submitted to the court set up by 
chapter 61) and disseisins done by Henry II and Richard (to which John thus 
had some hereditary claim and could properly claim the crusader's respite 
86. See Holt, Magna Carta, supra note 74 at 226-29. 
87. McKechnie, Magna Carta, supra note 79 at 381. 
88. Milsom, Historical Foundations, supra note 48 at 410-11. 
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before holding full justice to the claimants). This chapter showed no 
disapproval of operating outside the common law courts, only disapproval 
of operating outside the context of courts, whether feudal or common law. 
Clearly the people who drafted Magna Carta89 did not consider feudal courts 
either obsolete or irrelevant. 
These feudal elements permeating Magna Carta legitimate a closer look at 
the concerns of chapter 61 and the nature of the council of twenty-five it 
established. The council was empowered to distrain, not to make war. 
Distraint, however, was a traditional element of court process; a feudal court 
distrained a tenant to come to court to answer. 90 In that situation likewise, 
satisfaction of the court resulted in return of the distraints. The council was a 
court. The projected nature of this court is striking for its distance from the 
feudal obligations described by Glanvill only twenty-seven years earlier. 91 
Such ac.tion against a lord then would have resulted in immediate forfeiture; 
now lords could think of disciplining their own lord without suffering drastic 
consequences. Then any discipline exercised by a feudal court could well 
occasion forfeiture; now distraint was merely pressure to be applied with no 
threat of complete disinheritance. Nevertheless, the king still found being 
disciplined by his tenants a repulsive idea. Moreover, after John's death, it 
seemed inappropriate to others: chapter 61 did not survive in the successive 
revisions of Magna Carta. 
The council of twenty-five, however, was in no sense superior to the 
king. 92 Simply because they were empowered to distrain and to enforce their 
lord's undertakings against him would not have been equivalent in their 
minds to being superior to their lord. They were admittedly in a desperate 
position; their desires were to put the king under restrictions similar to those 
under which the king's court put them. Those restrictions had increasingly 
come to seem the proper standards for just action. But there was no superior 
court to bind the king. The only alternative was to create the same effect 
within the feudal court. Feudal courts, by their very nature, were capable of 
89. Holt casts doubt on the decisive influence of Stephen Langton in the drafting of the 
charter, and proposes instead the influence of judges, officials, and clerks. Holt, 
Magna Carta, supra note 74 at 175-200. The problem with that suggestion is that they 
were John's appointees. More likely drafters would be the baron's seneschals, who 
were both lawyers and administrators. They had both the sense of technicality and the 
responsiveness to baronial desires, as well as a wider perspective concerning the 'free 
tenant'. See R.C. Palmer, 'Origins of the Legal Profession in England', II Irish Jurist 
126-46 (1976); Palmer, County Courts, supra note 83 at 113-38. 
90. Milsom, Legal Framework, supra note 38 at 10-11. 
91. Superiority or inferiority cannot be determined by the locus of the power to render 
judgments. Medieval courts often had the tenants rendering judgments, both early on in 
the king's court and routinely in county and feudal courts. The power to render 
judgments only establishes a group as superior if that corresponds also with social 
perceptions and politics. The barons, however, could well have perceived themselves 
as merely rendering judgments on the lord of the court, without denying (or concluding 
anything concerning) his superiority. 
92. Milsom, Legal Framework, supra note 38 at 10. 
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rendering judgments contrary to their lord's desire: that was the preservation 
of the group interest and the sociological reason why the homage group and 
not the lord rendered judgments in a feudal court. What Magna Carta added 
to this royal feudal court was the power to distrain its lord. Distraint of the 
lord was as close as they could come to simulating the king's court's 
regulation of their own feudal courts. Inferiors here acted on their superior, 
trying to make him abide by new standards of justice. 
The execution of the project was impractical, particularly with an An-
gevin king. The attempt was nonetheless worthwhile: it established a new 
set of guidelines and expectations.93 For understanding the barons and the 
nature of the change in the law, however, chapter 61 is most important. It 
demonstrates that to some small extent they realized what had happened and 
were capable of trying to match the effects that the common law had had on 
them now in their own dealings with the king. As Milsom has said about 
Magna Carta, 'the myth should be allowed to stand, but on its head'. 94 The 
Angevin kings had themselves established the rules by which the magnates 
now wanted even monarchs to abide. Those rules had given a new element 
to the conception of justice, an element hostile to discretion and partial to 
rigid rules. 
Conclusion 
The appearance of property was not a 'mere legal' phenomenop, without 
impact on society. The establishment of property rights in land carried with 
it a diminution, although hardly a disappearance, of the dependence of 
tenants on their lords. The obverse side of that increased independence was 
a greater acceptance and reliance on the royal institutions that now pro-
tected, even guaranteed those resources so vital to the current needs of 
individuals and the projected needs of their survivors. That crucial role of 
beneficial care had been assumed now by the king's government. The social 
impact of the change that actually happened, however, can be quantified by 
examining other effects of the origins of the property. The regulation that 
secured tenants from lordly supervision and so produced property, produced 
by the same token greater liquidity of the major economic resources of that 
society: the land. The result of that change, coupled with the easy availabil-
ity of silver, produced one of the two monumental pre-modem English 
inflations, despite the presence of other severe deflationary pressures. 
The regulation that produced the common law also changed ideas about 
justice. To the extent that feudal courts had dealt with matters not strictly 
determined by procedure, they had operated in a discretionary framework. 
93. Magna Carta was not a statute, but a grant. Such a royal grant was not subject to 
interpretation as strict rules of law by the court against the king: Magna Carta, like 
coronation charters, was a serious undertaking, taken seriously by all, but not rigid. 
This became even more so after c.61 was deleted from the document. 
94. Milsom, Legal Framework, supra note 38 at 25. 
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That framework had operated by custom, a complicated mix of what had 
been done before and what, all appropriate considerations weighed and 
balanced, ought now to be done. Acceptance of custom as the standard of 
regulation, wielded by bureaucratic minded justices, resulted in rigid rules 
of law, applied perhaps normally in ways entirely congruent with old 
applications, but now also in situations that were entirely inappropriate. The 
rigidity of those substantive rules, a new phenomenon in England, came to 
seem the just way to proceed. A model of law that venerated inflexible rules 
began to supersede the old discretionary model. The degree to which the 
model had been accepted appears in Magna Carta. That change in ex-
pectations made the Angevin continuance of old-style lordly prerogatives-
particularly when bureaucratic agencies came to reinforce royal authority-
seem unjust. In the particular circumstances of John's reign, then, the 
barons felt justified and capable of trying to regulate the lord king in his 
court as he had been regulating them in theirs. By 1215 the common law 
was well on its way to becoming a legal system; it had likewise become an 
indispensable part of the way in which Englishmen thought and the way in 
which they perceived themselves. 
